


# CC-Hunter: Uncovering Covert Timing Channels on Shared Processor Hardware

Jie Chen | Guru Venkataramani | George Washington University | Washington DC, USA

## 1. Problem

- ❖ **Covert Channels** illicitly leaks sensitive secrets to malicious parties
  - Trojan (sender) and Spy (receiver) collude to subvert system security policy
- ❖ **Covert Timing Channels**
  - **Covert Timing Channels** are extremely stealthy
  - **Very Challenging** to detect and prevent

## 2. Covert Timing Channel on Hardware



- **Combinational structures**
  - E.g., compute logics and buses
  - Conflict → contention patterns
- **Memory structures**
  - E.g., caches
  - Conflict → block replacement

## 3. How to Detect Covert Timing Channels?

### Detection Framework


Identify the event behind conflicts (contention)

Construct event train




Apply Pattern Detection Algorithms

## 4. Design of Pattern Detection Algorithms

### ❖ Detection on Combinational Structures




### ❖ Detection on Memory Structures



## 5. Hardware Support


### ❖ Dedicated auditor unit: CC Auditor

- Gathers covert timing channel related events
- Audits two hardware events at any give time



### ❖ Conflict Miss Tracker

- Tracks cache conflict miss events
- A practical design based on generation bits



### ❖ Cache conflicts recorder

- Two alternating 128-byte vector registers
- record the hardware context ID of the replacer and victim

### ❖ Hardware histogram buffer

- 32-bit count-down register for Δt
- 16-bit register for event density in each Δt
- 128-entry histogram

## 6. Software Support

### ❖ Software API

- Places a microarchitectural unit under audit
- OS does privilege checks before letting the user to monitor the unit

### ❖ Software monitor

- Accumulates all data from hardware auditor
- Could be scheduled to run on un-audited cores

## 7. Experimental Setup

### ❖ Cycle accurate full system simulator MARSSx86

- Simulates a Quad core processor, 2.5 GHz, with two hyperthreads

### ❖ Test on two realistic covert timing channels

- Integer divider and Shared L2 cache

### ❖ Evaluation uses combinations of

- I/O-intensive Filebench server benchmark
- Memory-intensive Stream benchmarks
- SPEC2006 CPU benchmarks

## 8. Experimental Results




Fig. 1 Varying bandwidth Rates

Fig. 2 Reduced Observation Window for 0.1bps Cache Channels

Fig. 3 SPEC06, Stream & FileBench Benchmark False Alarm Test